


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4. The projection for Fiscal Year 1970 is not yet firm but is expected to be about the same as for Fiscal Year 1969.



Robert S. Wattles  
Director of Personnel

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2 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : DDP's "Proposal to Augment Selection Standards for CTP"


1. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for comments on the Subject Proposal.

2. It is my considered opinion that this proposal, if implemented, would serve neither the best interests of the Agency nor of the Clandestine Services itself. If the CS is authorized to make independent selection of junior professionals for the Career Training Program, which would be the practical effect of this proposal, other Directorates may well follow suit, and justifiably so. Such fragmentation of the selection process would destroy the admittedly successful formula of this Program, i. e., the integration of careful selection, training, and constant evaluation over many months by professional intelligence officers to assure that a promising individual's talents are identified, developed, and then applied in the type of work to which he or she is best suited, taking into account the Agency's needs as a whole.

3. In our experience, pre-selection of candidates for assignment to a given Directorate, and even more so to a given job, is much less likely to match the man to the job for which he is best suited than is the system which this Program painstakingly has evolved in cooperation with the Directorates. This view is fully shared by the three CS officers who are assigned to the Career Training Staff.

4. Implicit in this proposal is a certain dissatisfaction with the CTP selection process. Yet, for seventeen years, this Program's selection and training techniques have provided the CS with

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a generation of junior officers who, in overwhelming percentage, have been judged by their superiors to be highly successful. As noted above, there are three CS officers assigned to this Staff; also assigned to the Staff are three OTR officers who have experience in clandestine field operations. Given articulate guidance by the CS, the CT Staff does an effective job of selecting candidates for the CS as well as for the other Directorates. This Staff has been as discriminating in its selections as CS quotas for CTs have allowed it to be and at this time of reduced quotas is applying criteria which are at least equal to those suggested in DDP's memorandum.

5. This proposal is not without precedent. Seeking more direct CS participation in the CT selection process, the DDP in 1965 directed his division and staff chiefs, their deputies, and other senior officers to take turns in participating daily in CTP interviews at 1000 Glebo. After an experiment which lasted several months, each CS officer left with the conviction that the CTP selection criteria and their application were highly professional in accomplishing CS purposes. Once satisfied, CS enthusiasm for the procedure waned, senior officers became less and less available, and the experiment lapsed.

6. You will recall that last year, after considerable soul-searching and experimentation, the CS CT Selection Board, through its Chairman, concluded that the best time for evaluating a CT candidate for a career in the CS is upon completion of his operational training when a more valid judgment of the candidate's suitability can be made. A very serious risk in the present DDP proposal is that a premature, one-time snap judgment may deny employment to a significant number of applicants who, in the experience of this Staff, reveal within the training cycle a wealth of hitherto latent talent. On the opposite side of the coin, an applicant selected solely by the CS, if subsequently washed out in his quest for an operational career, may not have residual talents for assignment elsewhere in the Agency. One of the more useful tools of the CT Staff is to measure a candidate's possible versatility in terms of the Agency's needs as a whole. This resource would be absent in any CS unilateral selection procedure.

7. There is also a weakness in the proposal arising from a misconception as to the usefulness of the results of Part I of the professional test battery in making selection of candidates. As presently projected,

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the results of Part I (field testing) will not be directly relevant in helping to evaluate an applicant's personality, attitudes, political interests, and cultural knowledge -- all of which were cited recently by senior CS officers as among the vital elements a CS "headhunter" should possess. CTP already has objected strongly to the proposed testing plan, as you know, on the grounds that the results of Part II, to be taken at Headquarters, will become available some three weeks following the interviews in which they could have proved most meaningful.

8. One point must be conceded. Beginning in FY 1965, as a result of strong pressures from a number of sources, OTR and CTP were prevailed upon to expand the size of the Program. The CS quota was established at 90 CTs annually, and for FY 1968 was raised to 140 annually to implement the special China Program. Assurances were offered all around that this step could be accomplished without an appreciable drop in the caliber of CTs or their training. But the fact of the matter is that from 1965 until the recent cutback in the Program, CTP had to accept a number of marginal candidates in order to satisfy the pressures of larger quotas. Three years' experience with this approach has shown it to be unrealistic and specious. Even before the impact of the BALPA Exercise became apparent, there were indications from all the Directorates that while large CT inputs could be accommodated in terms of budget and ceiling, they could not always be accommodated as in the past, in terms of satisfying jobs or effective on-the-desk development. We are increasingly conscious of the current budgetary limitations on hiring new personnel and have taken steps to accept only the most qualified. My concern now is that we maintain high selection standards if pressures for increased quotas begin anew.

9. Whether or not one infers from DDP's proposal a certain dissatisfaction with the caliber of some of the recently-assigned CTs, the fact remains that CTP cannot operate anything more than a pedestrian personnel and training program when huge numbers are involved. Diminishing returns inevitably set in at some point, in terms of caliber of the candidates accepted. I believe this Program ought to be established on a rational, stable base whose numbers and selection standards do not ebb and flow in relation to the size of the budgetary pie. I believe that the Agency ought to make a clear determination that this Program's


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purpose should be to select highly-qualified junior professionals who, while certainly not an elite corps, should have open to them job opportunities commensurate with their ability levels. Such has not always been the case in the last three years and it has not always been the "marginal" CT who has been assigned to the job without challenge.

10. There is not a simplistic answer to this problem for many factors are involved, a fair number of which are prerogatives of components other than OTR. But in our opinion the point of diminishing returns has been reached when we endeavor to recruit more than approximately 75 CTs annually for the CS, 40 for the Directorate of Intelligence, and 20 for the Support Services. The idea that this should be a selective Program has been eclipsed to a considerable extent because of what seems to be a relatively greater emphasis on budgetary and ceiling projections. Budgetary and other current considerations in the CS obviously are such that for the foreseeable future we will be operating at an even lower level on behalf of that component. Assuming, however, that we are to maintain high selection and training standards, I would hope that any future pressures for operating levels higher than those indicated above could be resisted successfully. Even now CTP is convinced that the present quotas for DD/I and DD/S, 55 and 30 respectively, are unrealistically high and ought to be reduced.

11. The two dangers specified in this memorandum -- fragmentation of selection and oversized level of operation -- could very easily undermine the expertise and resources developed by this Program over a long period of time and to considerable degree eradicate what even the Bureau of the Budget regards as one of the most effective programs in this Agency.

  
Chief, Career Training Program

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25 JAN 1968

5X1 MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA : Director of Training

SUBJECT : Extension of Tour

1. This is to advise you an extension of your assignment to the Office of Training until your scheduled retirement date of 30 June 1969 has been approved.

2. The Clandestine Services appreciates your excellent performance in your current assignment and wishes you continuing success.




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28 FEB  
1967

X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

VIA : Director of Training

SUBJECT : Extension of Tour

1. This is to advise that your Career Service has approved your request and the recommendation of OTR that your assignment to the Career Training Staff be extended through June 1968.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans has asked me to extend his appreciation, on behalf of our Service, for your fine showing in the OTR assignment, and to offer his wishes for continuing success.

[REDACTED]

DDP/CP

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee  
1 - D/TR  
1 - OTR/Pers  
1 - Soft File  
1 - Chrono

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
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DTR-1619

DD/S 68-4206

15 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : DD/P Proposal to Augment Selection  
Standards for CTs

1. The desirability of selecting for the Clandestine Services the best qualified prospective careerists obtainable is a point on which all elements currently involved in the selection, training, placement, and utilization process are in full agreement. Differences arise only with regard to the means most likely to attain this goal. The thoughts expressed herein are designed primarily to focus on this aspect of the problem and to supplement those expressed in my memorandum to you, dated 2 August 1968, same Subject.

2. It does not necessarily follow that an upgrading of selection criteria calls for a major change in the selection system itself. What is called for is a more precise articulation of selection criteria followed by a concerted effort to satisfy those criteria. For several months prior to DD/P's proposal, the Career Training Staff has been engaged in continuous discussion with CS representatives, primarily the Chairman of the CS CT Selection Board, the DD/P Training Officer, and the CS Personnel Staff to evolve and articulate more discriminative criteria. We believe that very constructive understanding and results have come from these discussions and that the few candidates now being selected as prospective CS careerists in fact have qualifications which conform closely to the criteria indicated in DD/P's proposal. We plan to continue these close consultations and if the DD/P desires to designate other officers with whom we should consult with regard to criteria as well as about specific candidates CTP will gladly cooperate.

3. We think, however, it is risky to condemn a system because of a change, quantitatively speaking, in the ability of the CS to absorb CT. The recent contention by CS representatives that CTs assigned to the Directorate in 1967 and 1968, as a group, are wanting

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

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4. It is quite true that the field recruiter has applied general criteria in recommending CT candidates for the CS. The DD/P proposal envisages that more selective criteria would be applied through review by CS representatives at Headquarters. I submit that a better starting point is an articulation by the CS of more discriminative, and particularized, criteria for use by the recruiter in the field.



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6. I should like to reiterate one point I made in my earlier memorandum. The suitability of a CT candidate for a career in the CS can be judged, in the opinion of most experienced operations officers, only over time much in the same way that an agent is spotted, developed and carefully assessed over time. An officer, however experienced, who endeavors to make a definitive judgment on the basis of file review (containing PHS, partial test results, and academic record) or following the interview of an applicant risks a relatively higher probability of error. Those accepted through this approach can be evaluated over time and be eliminated if indeed they are found subsequently not to be qualified. But for those rejected through this approach, the judgment can very easily be premature and lose for the Agency a number of highly promising individuals whose talents, vis-a-vis the CS, have yet to be developed.

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7. The DD/P Training Officer recently (5 August 1968) sent to the Chief of Station [redacted] a memorandum stating that "the DD/P is dependent upon the judgment of the faculty [redacted] relative to the

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evaluation and impressions of the CS-oriented CT". He stated that "we are particularly interested in the CT's attitude, industry, intelligence, resourcefulness, his personal integrity, his ability to work in harmony with his contemporaries and his peers and his potential to become a successful operations officer in the Clandestine Services." Given the fact that CTs selected as prospective CS careerists have certain objective qualifications to begin with, the evidence of his suitability for the CS in these more subjective areas cannot easily be ascertained except over time.

8. It is my belief that, despite the demonstrated success of the CTP formula and the fact that in 1965 senior CS officers were fully satisfied by their own personal involvement that the CT selection process worked very successfully, steps probably will have to be taken again to satisfy the DD/P and his staff that the system is fully responsive to CS needs and interests.

9. Consequently, I would propose that members of the CT Staff and those CS officers designated by the DD/P meet together for the purpose of becoming mutually informed about selection criteria, applicant processing, selection methodology, the training program, evaluation techniques, salary and promotion factors, cover and security considerations. Subsequently, CTP would refer to the CS representatives, preferably by personal consultation, the files of applicants who, in the preliminary judgment of the CT Staff, are possible CS prospects. Given the fact that the applicant file flow is a continual process and that expeditious handling is important, such referrals would have to be on a regular, sometimes daily basis. The separation of the two staffs, one at Headquarters and the other at 1000 Glebe, is impractical but would have to be surmounted.

10. If judged suitable for further processing, the applicant would be invited to Headquarters for interviews and other processing, subject to the issuance of invitee clearances by the Offices of Security and Medical Services. An increasingly complicated and dispersed Headquarters processing would become even more so with the addition of a CS interview and make more imperative tight scheduling and promptness in handling the applicant. The applicant we seek typically is either employed, is in military service, or is enrolled in a university. Extended absence frequently is impracticable; we have to be able to schedule a visit at his convenience and, again, since the applicant flow is continual, the availability of interviewers must be constant, sometimes on short notice. Most applicant visits, however, are scheduled at least two weeks in advance.

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11. I would propose that on his first of two trips to Headquarters, the applicant be scheduled for a two-day visit, the first of which would be devoted to CTP briefing and interviews. These require six hours on the average, including lunch hour, and I believe would continue to be necessary in order to determine whether or not the applicant, indeed, is CTP-qualified in general and is, in fact, a CS prospect in particular. These interviews presently are conducted at 1000 Glebe, but if they could be relocated to the Headquarters Building reasonably immediate consultation and participation by CS representatives would be possible. Otherwise, practical considerations dictate that the CS interview would have to be delayed until the afternoon of the second day, the morning of which would be devoted to the second half of the professional test battery. I think it is important that a member of the CT Staff participate with the CS interviewers to clarify any matters pertaining to training, salary, and administrative factors that so frequently are raised by applicants.

12. Under this procedure, all medical processing and the polygraph interview would be deferred until the second two-day visit. In the event the test results raise questions which should be explored further, an additional interview also could be scheduled during the second trip.

13. Impossible to overlook is the fact that when an applicant, with limited time available, comes to Headquarters for processing, he will have to visit three different locations as matters now stand -- 1000 Glebe, the Rosslyn complex, and the Headquarters Building. Shuttle runs between Headquarters and 1000 Glebe require 32 minutes, 70 minutes between departure times. There is no shuttle service between Rosslyn and 1000 Glebe. A significant amount of time thus is lost in traveling from one location to another.

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14. The procedure described above in oversimplified terms appears to be a reasonable arrangement which should satisfy the present purposes of the CS. But it contains some not so obvious pitfalls which are nonetheless real. The first, as already mentioned, is premature rejection of an individual due to limited availability of data and limited context for proper evaluation. The second is that pre-determined selection of CS candidates virtually negates the entire selection, evaluation/counseling, and placement expertise of the CT Staff. Its only remaining function with regard to CS-bound CTs is to service their administrative needs and to stand by as a disposal squad in the event a CT falls flat on his face. In reality, the CS representatives will have selected and presumably determined the assignment of CTs, placed them in training slots, but will not have responsibility for day-to-day management of them or for their re-direction or termination if that should become necessary.

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15. A third factor is that the group of CS officers on the Personnel Management Committee -- those apparently designated for this function -- will have to approach the selection problem in very much the same way as the three experienced CS officers presently assigned to the CT Staff, i. e. from written requirements produced by the operating elements of the CS. Under these circumstances, I fail to see how their involvement really contributes anything positive to the process.

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16. CTP's experience with panel interviewing indicates that this is less efficacious than a one-to-one interview situation. Facing a new and somewhat imposing setting yet denied the opportunity to relate on an individual basis, an applicant tends not to be natural and becomes relatively reticent. An accurate perception of the individual is made difficult under these circumstances.

17. A major implication of the DD/P's proposal is that the training program could not realistically continue on present terms. It is structured in such a way that the early portions probe the individual for strengths and weaknesses before a determination is made as to which component of the Agency is his most appropriate outlet, only after which is he trained in the skills needed by that component. Pre-determination of CS prospects, whether accurate or erroneous, makes this procedure superfluous. If erroneous, it does make the disposal problem more serious. Moreover, a given CT Class cannot long sustain discrimination of treatment among its members, between those whose area of assignment is already determined and those for whom it is not. Major morale and handling problems would inevitably arise from such a situation, at least until such time as the other Directorates also pre-select their candidates.

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18. Even with regard to the operational training phase, experienced operations officers who are assigned as instructors at [redacted] have commented that a trainee who already knows his assignment pays less attention and trains less well in matters which he thinks do not relate directly to his anticipated assignment. The reality of this phenomenon is at cross purposes with recent CS emphasis on the preparation of a rounded operations officer for a comprehensive career in the CS.

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20. Having reviewed the DD/P proposal and given it careful thought, it still is not clear to me just what DD/P believes is so seriously wrong with the CTP selection technique that an alternative or supplementary procedure seems necessary. I remain convinced that the greater needs right now are for more precise articulation of personnel requirements by the CS and better post-training development and management of the CT.

[Redacted Signature]

Chief, Career Training Program

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12 AUG 1968

Notes for Discussion with Mr. Richardson

1. We are not putting into question the performance of the CT Program for the years preceding 1967. We believe it successfully met the problems of the times under criteria acceptable to the CS. Now the situation has changed. We are attempting to adjust to the change through a more particularized selection of recruits geared to the projected needs of the Service as we see them in the 1970's. New and stricter criteria are in order, relating specific Service requirements to the individuality of the persons selected to fulfill them.


2. We have completed our tentative and impressionistic evaluation of CTs graduating in 1967 and 1968. It points to the need for the change in criteria which we propose. Each has been interviewed and all training and other records examined. (Compiled data will show a minority of recruits with usable language or high capability for its acquisition and a minority with useful area knowledge or vocational experience. A limited number possess high potential for future success as CS operations officers.)

3. The CT classes examined by us constitute good raw material, but in the light of future conditions as we visualize them they do not bring sufficient with them by way of previously acquired qualifications. 25X

X1 [redacted] should be made by senior officers well experienced in CS operations, not against a stereotype but against the personality characteristics of each individual insofar as they are determinable. Conditions no longer permit the recruitment of groups of people against groups of positions. The CS recruitment problem no longer has the quantitative aspects which existed until the mid-sixties but rather is now primarily concerned with qualitative factors.

X1 4. Recruiters can maintain a certain adherence to objective factors such as [redacted] 25X  
[redacted] but the DDP must be in position to weigh the subjective factors through interview evaluations by his own staff. Since the CT Program after EOD does not have the capability to take over entrants which the DDP might find unsuitable for service in the CS, it seems reasonable for the

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DDP to have access to recruits before they come on board. Admittedly the interposal of the necessary procedure to accomplish this will create some difficulties; but in the last analysis the excellence of the Service in future years will require accommodation, however difficult, to the measures which bear the best promise of bringing about that result.

*Guy*

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